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Displacement without end:
internally displaced who can’t go home
by Bill Frelick
n contrast, the most widely
accepted definition of an intern-
ally displaced person (found in
the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement) fails to mention protec-
tion and does not clearly delineate
when a person ceases to be internally
displaced. That definition rests funda-
mentally on the notion of movement –
that IDPs have been "forced or obliged
to flee or to leave their home … and
have not crossed an internationally
recognised State border." Likewise, the
final section of the Guiding Principles
– dealing with return, resettlement
and reintegration – makes no mention
of the word protection but rather
emphasises return movement or
resettlement. 
Principle 28 calls upon competent
authorities to allow IDPs to "return
voluntarily in safety and with dignity,
to their homes or places of habitual
residence, or to resettle voluntarily in
another part of the country."
Authorities are not specifically called
upon to offer protection but rather to
"endeavour to facilitate the reintegra-
tion of returned or resettled internally
displaced persons." Principle 29 calls
for nondiscrimination towards IDP
returnees and their right to equal
access to public services, and sug-
gests that IDPs have a right either to
recovery of their abandoned proper-
ty/possessions or to compensation.
It does not specifically say that IDPs
who have relocated and reintegrated
to another part of their country (pre-
sumably re-availing themselves of the
protection of their government) have
ceased to be IDPs. The Guiding
Principles don’t say this because they
can’t. To be an IDP is not a legal sta-
tus. To be a refugee is. ‘Internally
displaced person’ is a descriptive
term [see article by Kälin, pp. 15].
‘Displacement’ as a word requires move-
ment. Someone or something cannot be
‘undisplaced’ unless the movement is
reversed and the person or object
restored to its original location.
The Guiding Principles acknowledge
the fundamental gap in human rights
law between being internally dis-
placed and being a refugee. In Section
Two, the Principles relating to protec-
tion from displacement speak of the
right not to be "arbitrarily" displaced
but recognise that some displacement,
such as for large-scale development
projects, may be justified by "com-
pelling and overriding public
interests" and that "measures shall be
taken to minimize displacement and
its adverse effects." One cannot sub-
stitute the word ‘refugee’ here.
Human rights law finds no justifica-
tion under any circumstances for
making someone a refugee because
the threat underlying refugee status is
persecution and the lack of protection
against being persecuted. IDPs, on the
other hand, may be displaced for a
variety of reasons not limited to per-
secution.
If the cause of displacement is not
necessarily persecution or even an act
prohibited by international law, and if
the solution for an IDP is not strictly
speaking the restoration or acquisi-
tion of protection but simply return
to the previous status quo, does an
IDP have a right to return? The princi-
pal legal architect of the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement,
Walter Kälin, writes, "there is no gen-
eral rule in present international law
that affirms the right of internally dis-
placed persons to return to their
original place of residence or to move
to another safe place of their choice
within their home country."
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So, even though international law
does not support a right of IDP
return, the descriptive reality cannot
cease until such return happens.
What, therefore, ought to be the
rights-based concern on behalf of
internally displaced people?
The rights concern ought not to be
because a person is internally dis-
placed per se but – by analogy with
the underlying concern for refugees –
because a person who is internally
displaced lacks the protection of their
government and, owing to fear of per-
secution, is unable to access that
protection. The rights concern ought
to be particularly heightened for IDPs
who are prevented from seeking asy-
lum from persecution in another
country. The human rights concern
ought fundamentally to focus on
those IDPs who fear persecution with-
in their country and who lack the
protection of – or are threatened by –
their own government. Unfortunately,
myriad examples of such circum-
stances exist – Angola, Burma,
Chechnya, Colombia, Congo-Kinshasa,
Iraq, Liberia, Sudan. The list goes on. 
There are, however, millions of other
people who are also counted as IDPs
because they have been displaced in
one manner or another from their
places of origin but who have relocat-
ed and reintegrated in another part of
their country and enjoy the same civil
and political rights as their fellow
citizens. If we may take the refugee
analogy, their situation would be
comparable to the refugee who has
lost his/her home and possessions
and cannot return to reclaim them
but who has found protection under
another government. Such a refugee
has suffered a grievous wrong and
There is relatively little doubt about when refugee
status ends. The 1951 Refugee Convention clearly
spells out that refugee status ends when the refugee
is no longer in need of protection. The fundamental
principle underlying the refugee definition is not
movement across a border but protection or the lack
thereof from the government of his/her home country.
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usually continues to suffer hardship
as a result of those losses. But, legal-
ly, the person is no longer a refugee. 
Internal flight alternative
and IDPs
Human rights, at least with regard to
civil and political rights, tend toward
the minimalist, such as the rights not
to be tortured and abused. Refugee
rights, as conceived by the drafters of
the Refugee Convention, are similarly
modest. The foundation stone of the
Refugee Convention is the principle of
non-refoulement, the right of a person
not to be returned to a place where
s/he would be persecuted. ‘Place’ is
not generally interpreted to mean the
entirety of a refugee’s home country.
Thus, asylum jurisprudence in an
increasing number of states embraces
the notion of an ‘internal flight alter-
native’ or ‘internal protection’ – the
notion that refugees can be denied
asylum and returned to their country
of origin even if they cannot return to
their home or habitual place of resi-
dence within that country. In effect,
refugee law in a growing number of
states allows the explicit creation of
internally displaced persons. It recog-
nises that a person has a well-founded
fear in one part of his/her country
but that the same person could enjoy
the protection of his/her government
in another part of the country. The
key consideration is that the threat of
persecution does not exist outside the
refugee’s original locality and that the
person’s government is willing and
able to protect them.
The internal flight alternative concept
is still quite controversial, and this
author has been among its fiercest
critics,
2 but it is less controversial
when the feared persecutor is a local
non-governmental entity opposed by
the central government, when the
refugee identifies with the majority
population and embraces the ideology
of the central government, and where
the government gives every assurance
that it extends the same rights of citi-
zenship and opportunity to the
returnee as would be enjoyed by
other citizens in the government-
controlled part of the country who
never left. 
Take as an example an ethnic Kurd
and an ethnic Turk from southeastern
Turkey. Both may have fled Turkey
and sought asylum in Germany.
For the sake of argument, let us say
that both asylum seekers have suc-
cessfully established a well-founded
fear of persecution in southeastern
Turkey. The Turkish Kurd fears perse-
cution at the hands of government
forces and government proxies. The
ethnic Turk fears persecution at the
hands of Kurdish militants. Because
of the involvement of the central gov-
ernment, the Kurd can be said not to
enjoy an internal flight alternative
since his fear of persecution cannot
be confined to the southeastern
region. For the Turk, on the other
hand, relocation and reintegration in
central or western Turkey might be a
viable option if he does not feel
threatened by his government and
regards the threat as entirely local; if
his government is willing and able to
protect him and if the local non-gov-
ernmental forces that would harm
him should he return to the southeast
do not have the means of carrying out
such a threat beyond that region.
However, it is indisputable that when
Germany returns the Turkish refugee
to Istanbul or Ankara, even though the
person at that moment ceases to be a
refugee, he, in fact, becomes an IDP.
As already established by the term
itself, he remains an IDP until he is
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However, he does not necessarily
remain a human rights concern for
the international community. His
welfare now becomes the particular
concern of his own government. 
Conclusion
Millions of IDPs are able to relocate
and integrate in other parts of their
country. Most commonly, they are at
least nominal members of the coun-
try’s majority ethnic nationality and
linguistic group and have fled or been
expelled by a secessionist minority
living in an ethnic enclave. This has
become a particularly common phe-
nomenon in Europe in the 1990s:
ethnic Georgians displaced from
Abkhazia; ethnic Azeris from
Nagorno-Karabakh; ethnic and linguis-
tic Russians from Chechnya; ethnic
Serbs from Kosovo. Their suffering is
real, their losses devastating, but gen-
erally they enjoy the protection of
their governments and are able to
exercise their rights as citizens. If any
of these enclaves were to succeed in
their quest for independence, these
displaced persons would not qualify
for refugee status if they were offered
and exercised their rights as citizens
in their new locations.
Strictly speaking, they remain IDPs.
Yet if the concern for IDPs ultimately
rests on their similarity to refugees –
the commonly stated notion that IDPs
are people who would be refugees if
they crossed an international border –
then the solutions for refugees must
have some bearing on how the inter-
national community regards IDPs.
Without minimising the anguish or
the continuing humanitarian needs of
IDPs who enjoy the protection of their
government, their plight should not
be regarded as equally compelling to
that of IDPs who are threatened by
their country’s government. 
Such IDPs are, indeed, especially
vulnerable because they remain within
the territory of that country.
Especially in light of the deference
paid to national sovereignty not only
by other states but also by interna-
tional humanitarian agencies of the
UN and the ICRC, they should be
regarded as at highest risk because
they have the least opportunity for
protection. For such IDPs the right to
seek asylum from persecution outside
their country ought to be paramount,
and ‘solutions’ such as ‘safe havens’
inside their country or other internal
flight alternatives should be looked
upon with the utmost scepticism. 
Ultimately who is counted as an IDP
either rests on the most inclusive
meaning of the words ‘internally dis-
placed’ or has a functional meaning.
While reasonable arguments may be
made for drawing the line more
broadly to include people unable to
return to their homes or places of
habitual residence or to include peo-
ple who have not been compensated
for their losses, the narrower line based
on the lack of protection defines the
subset of IDPs who must be of most
compelling concern to the rights-
regarding international community.
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Clarification
FMR 16 included an article
by Pascale Ghazaleh on dis-
placed Sudanese in Cairo. 
The article stated that "one
church offered to help fund
the Sacred Heart school but
on condition that all the
Muslim students were
expelled". It has since come
to light that no such condi-
tion had been imposed.
The author had acted in good
faith on information received
but both she and FMR would
like to apologise to the Joint
Relief Ministry and its donors
for any distress or inconve-
nience that may have been
caused. We wish them well
with their excellent work. For
more information on JRM,
please visit: www.geocities.
com/jrmcairo/aboutUs.html
Copyright and disclaimer: Material
from Forced Migration Review may be
freely reproduced but please acknowl-
edge the source. Photographs should
only be reproduced in the context of the
articles in which they appear (and cred-
ited). Materials and information
contained in Forced Migration Review
are the opinions of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the
Editors, the Refugee Studies Centre or
the Norwegian Refugee Council.
U
N
H
C
R
/
A
 
H
o
l
l
m
a
n
n
Returned IDPs,
Kelucha village,
Taskhinvali area,
Georgia.